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INTRODUCTION
Patent law has been described as "the Price of Life".! This can most strikingly be
seen when applied to developing countries' access to HIV/AIDS drugs. Since the
explosion of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the 1980's,2 the disease referred to as the
"Modern Black Death"3 has devastated large parts of populations in several developing
countries. 4 Because of several reasons, including strong patent protection advocated and
implemented by developed countries through TRIPS and the resulting high price of
medicines, these developing countries cannot afford the price of the HIV/AIDS drugs.
The majority of medicines used to treat this disease are patented. 5 As of 2005 there are an
estimated 38.6 million people living with HIV/AIDS.6 In developing and transnational
countries 6.8 million people are in immediate need of HIV/AIDS drugs. Of these, only
1.65 million are actually receiving them.7 Eliminating patent laws will not solve this
global epidemic. Allowing compulsory licensing in developing countries dealing with
large number of affected persons, and strengthening parallel importation laws, can help.
However, the larger issue is not simply how to treat the disease, but how to contain it and
prevent its spread.
1 Erika Mullenbach, The Influence of Disease on the Evolution of U.S. Patent Law andPolicy Towards
Foreign Patent Laws in the Late Twentieth to Early Twenty-First Century, 7 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
227, 228 (Spring 2005) (quoting Lynn Woods, Government AIDS Effects Target Drug Makers,
Pharmaceuticals Act to Stop Backlash Against Their IP Rights, Bus. WITHOUT BORDERS, Aug. 18, 2000, at
col. 1).
2 Avert.org, The History of AIDS: 1981 1986, http://www.avert.org/his8l 86.htm.
3 Mullenbach, supra note 1, at 235 (citing David P. Fidler, Racism or Realpolitik? U.S. Foreign Policy and
the HIV/AIDS Catastrophe in Sub-Saharan Africa, 7 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 97, 100 (2003)).
4 Id.
5 Christopher T. Nidel, Public Health, Hypocrisy, and Brown-Skinned People, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 355
(2004).
6 AVERT.ORG, Worldwide HIV & AIDS Statistics, available at www.avert.org/worldstats.htm (last visited
Oct. 22, 2006).
7 Id.
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This paper will examine the history of AIDS and international patent law, the
ways in which they intertwine and overlap, the international patent law agreements that
affect HIV/AIDS drugs distribution (specifically TRIPS §31, Doha and the 2003
Declaration, and the 2005 Amendment to TRIPS), compulsory licensing and other
options available to fight the HIV/AIDS epidemic, and finally analyze public and private
sector partnerships.
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC
Of the almost 40 million people suffering from HIV and AIDS worldwide, 95 % of
them live in developing countries. 8 The disease has killed more than 20 million people
around the world, is the leading cause of death in Africa, and is the fourth leading cause
of death worldwide. 9 Three million people die of AIDS every single year. 10 There are 5
million infections annually, which comes out to one person every six seconds. 1 1,900
children under the age of 15 are infected every day. Only 15-20,000 of these children are
being treated, while 600,000 are in need of urgent medical help. 12 In Africa, 12 million
children have lost a parent to AIDS.
13
Despite the huge number of affected people, the average country in Africa only
spends about $10 a year per person on health care. Yet a years supply of medicine might
cost as much as $12,000.14 While there is no cure for AIDS, there are several effective
8 The Global Fund, Fighting AIDS, available at http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/about/aids.
9Id
10Id
11Id.
12 UNITAID, A Global State of Emergency, available at http://www.unitaid.eu/EN-Un-etat-d-urgence-
mondial.html.
13 Id.
14Theodore C. Bailey, Innovation and Access: The Role of Compulsory Licensing in the Development and
Distribution of HIV/AIDS Drugs, 2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 193 (Spring 2001) (citing Gumisai
Mutume, Trade: Drug Companies Ease Up on South Africa, INTER PRESS SERVICE, Sept. 12, 1999,
available at 1999 WL 2737954).
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treatments that can prolong the length and quality of life for those affected. 15 But because
most of these medicines are patented, lack of competition creates strong barriers to
accessing these medicines.16 It has been estimated that a total of $7-10 billion a year is
needed to adequately address the HIV/AIDS epidemic.
17
In addition to the huge lack of funding in developing countries, there are several other
issues regarding treatment that need to be addressed. Should treatment become available
to those in need, a constant supply of the same drug is essential in preventing resistance,
and thus to not spread the disease any further. Most HIV and AIDS drugs work by
attaching to enzymes the virus needs to mutate. However, the virus quickly mutates and
becomes resistant within weeks. Because of this, most treatments focus on the
"combination therapy" approach, which tries to "overwhelm" HIV the disease with two
or three drugs. However, even this approach eventually loses its effectiveness." Should
the drugs fail, or if they are not taken properly, the virus will mutate. This causes the
drugs to become less effective, until they finally stop working. 19 Further, medicines need
to be taken on a very specific regimen, at specific times of the day and with or without
food.2 0 Once a person begins an anti-AIDS treatment, the drugs need to be taken
regularly for the rest of their life.2 '
While patents on HIV/AIDS medication will eventually expire, counting on this to
occur in order to secure lower prices for drugs is an ill-conceived notion. The problem is
15 Bailey, supra note 14.
16 Nidel, supra note 5.
17 The Global Fund, supra note 8.
18 New Protease Inhibitor Could Thwart AIDS Resistance To Current Drugs, SCIENCEDAILY.COM, February
4, 1999, available at http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/1999/02/990204082547.htm.
19AIDSMeds.com, Things You Should Know Before Starting Treatment,
http://www.aidsmeds.com/lessons/StartHere5.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).20id
21 UNAIDS, 2006 Report on the Global AIDS Epidemic, Ch. 7, Treatment and Care, available at
http://www.unaids.org/en/HIV data/2006Global Report/defau lt.asp.
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that "patent expiration is, at best, a reasonable guess since there are many strategies for
extending patents and many regulatory incentives for granting extended periods of
market exclusivity. " 22 There are several reasons drugs often do not come off patent when
projected. One, some drugs have several different patents. Two, manufacturers can
extend their patents by obtaining new ones. Three, even without new patents, it is still
possible to gain exclusive rights for longer periods of time. Four, often times
manufacturers develop newer medications with fewer side effects and greater success
rates by the time their old patents expire.
It could be argued that older medicines could still be effective, and thus using the
generic versions of these drugs once they come off patent would be a viable solution. The
problem with this argument is that with HIV and AIDS treatment there is a great need for
continuity. Resistance to drugs is a key concern with older drugs because when there is a
wide range of medicines available to the public more mutated strands develop. Should
large numbers of mutated strands be created, old nor new medicine is going to stop its
spread. Further, if a person develops a resistance to a drug it is likely they will becomes
resistant to the whole class of drugs. Therefore access to different, and often patented
drugs, again becomes crucial for survival.24
22 C Daniel Mullins, Francis Palumbo & Bruce Stuart, Projections of Drug Approvals, Patent Expiration
and Generic Entry to 2004, Business Briefing: Pharmagenerics 2005.
23 Id.
24 Kamala Sarup, Expensive H.I.V. Drugs Further Instability in South Asia, worldpress.org (July 7, 2005),
http://www.worldpress.org/Asia/2112.cfm
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II. THE RISE AND INTERTWINEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
AND THE HIV/AIDS EPIDEMIC
a. A QUICK HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL PATENT RIGHTS
Starting in the 1980's, the global economy experienced a substantial rise in the
importance of intellectual property rights and their relation to technology.25 This led to
the drafting, and implementing in 1995, of the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement. TRIPS required all World Trade Organization
(WTO) members to enact legislation establishing a minimum level of intellectual
property protection and harmonization of laws. 26 Under TRIPS, patents may be granted
as long as the invention is new, substantially different from previous inventions, and can
be industrially exploited.27 It is argued that patent monopolies "encourage[] innovation
and research.28 " While this may result in higher prices for consumers, the development of
new products and production processes is deemed to be a greater benefit to society.
29
The goal of TRIPS, as set out by the WTO Ministry of Foreign Affairs, is "to
balance the long-term goal of stimulating research and the development of new products
with the short-term goal of ensuring market access on reasonable terms for products and
production processes that have already been patented., 30 Further, "[lt]he WTO has
recognized that, for the poorest nations, the costs of protecting intellectual property rights
can outweigh the benefits."
31
25 Thomas A. Haag, TRIPS Since Doha: How Far Will the WTO Go Towards Modifying the Terms for
Compulsory Licensing?, 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 945 (December 2002).
26 See generally TRIPS, Annex 1 C.
27 Id. at §5, art. 27(1).
28 WTO Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.dep.no/ud/english/topics/trade/wto/doha/032121-
120019/dok-bn.html.29 [d.
30 id.
31 id.
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Those in favor of strong intellectual property rights argue that without sufficient
protection, pharmaceutical companies are reluctant to invest in developing countries.
Proponents also argue that protecting intellectual property rights promotes research and
development. 32 Creating drugs is extremely expensive - the cost of development from the
start of research to market launch was estimated to be $802 million as of 2001 .' A new
drug can also fail at any time while in development, usually resulting in a total loss of the
company's investment. 34 The pharmaceutical industry stresses that only one in every four
thousand drugs researched and developed is granted government approval and can thus
be marketed. 35 Because of their huge investments, pharmaceutical companies are eager to
reap all the financial benefits of their creations. These companies have successfully
patented many of their developed drugs, and have made huge sales and profits from
them.36The question thus becomes how to balance the interests of pharmaceutical
companies against the needs of developing countries.
b. A QUICK HISTORY OF HIV/AIDS AND ITS TREATMENT
Before the 1980's not much is known about the history of AIDS. The origin of the
disease is a mystery, but by 1980 HIV had spread to at least five continents (North
America, South America, Europe, Africa, and Australia).37 In June of 1981 the Center for
Disease Control published the first report on this previously unknown virus.31 While this
32 Id.
33 Press Release, Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development, Pegs Cost of a New Prescription
Medicine at $802 million (Nov. 30, 2001), available at
http://csdd.tufts.edu/NewsEvents/RecentNews.asp?newsid6 (last visited Oct. 23, 2006).
34Lisa C. Pavento, Jamie L. Greene & John K. McDonald, International Patent Protection for HIV-
Related Therapies: Patent Attorneys' Perspective, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 919 (Summer 2003).
35 Bailey, supra note 14.
36 id.
37J.M. Mann, AIDS: A worldwide Pandemic, CURRENT TOPICS IN AIDS, vol. 2 (edited by M.S. Gottlieb,
D.J. Jeffries, D. Mildvan, A. J. Pinching, T.C. Quinn, John Wiley & Sons) (1989).
38 Avert.org, The History of AIDS: 1981 1986, http://www.avert.org/his81 86.htm.
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report is often referred to as the "beginning" of AIDS, it is more accurately described as
the beginning of awareness. 39 In November of 1983 the first meeting of the world's
countries was held to discuss the global AIDS crisis. 40 At this time the World Health
Organization (WHO) reported that AIDS was present in the United States, Canada,
fifteen European countries, Haiti, Zaire, seven Latin American countries, Australia and
Japan.
4 1
Once the reality of the nature and extent of the HIV/AIDS virus set in, the patent
race was on. Drugs used to treat the disease have been, and still are, the focus of intense
research and development programs in the pharmaceutical industry. 42 In 1991, for
example, sixty-four firms were working on developing over eighty different drugs,
spending over $19 million a year.43
c. THE COST TO SOCIETY
The "age old debate questioning the fundamental societal value of intellectual
property rights" has arisen in the context of issuing compulsory licenses to developing
countries in order for them to supply their AIDS stricken populations with generic
drugs. 44 This problem is particularly troublesome considering that, while fewer than five
percent of medicines on the WTO Model List of Essential Medicines45 are patented,
39 id.
40 id.
41 id.
42 Bailey, supra note 14.
Id.
44 Haag, supra note 25.
45Duncan Matthews, WTO Decision on Implementation of Paragraph 6 of The Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: A Solution to the Access to Essential Medicines Problem?, 7 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 73 (March 2004) (citing World Health Organization Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation and
Public Health: Report by the Secretariat (Geneva: WHO, 56th World Health Assembly Provisional Agenda
Item 14.9, A56/17, 12 May 2003)).
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46
many new drugs designed to combat the HIV/AIDS virus are patented. It is argued that
"the premium prices of patented drugs make them unobtainable for the sickest and
weakest in the developing world and that these prices are unjustifiably expensive in view
of the shockingly high rates of HIV infection."
47
III. TRIPS: AGREEMENT ON TRADE-RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS
As mentioned previously, the WTO responded to the need for global intellectual
property rights by implementing TRIPS in 1995. One of the main considerations of this
Agreement was the special needs of developing countries - especially in regards to the
health issues devastating their populations.
a. BACKGROUND
48TRIPS came into effect on January 1, 1995. It was revolutional in that it not
only harmonized patent law, but connected it with international trade.49 TRIPS is a
minimum standards agreement, allowing Members to mandate higher standards of
protection if they so desire. Member states are also free to determine the appropriate
implementation methods for the Agreement within their national laws and practice.
50
TRIPS sought to promote increased research and development through a worldwide
patent protection system. 51 In spite of these goals, TRIPS specifically recognized "the
special needs of the least-developed country Members in respect of maximum flexibility
46 [d.
Id.
48 See generally TRIPS
49 Mullenbach, supra note 1, at 228.
50 See generally TRIPS
51 Jessica J. Fayerman, Comment, The Spirit of TRIPS and the Importation of Medicines Made Under
Compulsory License After the August 2003 TRIPS Council Agreement, 25 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 257,
267 (Fall 2004).
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in the domestic implementation of laws and regulations in order to enable them to create
a sound and viable technological base."
5 2
b. ARTICLE 27: PATENTABLE SUBJECT MATTER
Article 27 is important for two reasons. One, it expressly recognizes the conflict
between intellectual property protection and public health in §27(2) by stating that:
Members may exclude from patentability inventions, the prevention
within their territory of the commercial exploitation which is necessary to
protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, animal or
plant life or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment, provided that
such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is prohibited
by their law.
53
Two, while it contains an exception for "diagnostic, therapeutic and surgical methods for
the treatment of humans and animals" 54 to promote free use of new medical treatments, it
does not allow for the refusal to patent pharmaceutical drugs. 55 This seeming dichotomy
between the two sections of Article 27 is resolved somewhat in Article 31.
c. ARTICLE 31: OTHER USE WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION OF THE RIGHT
HOLDER
Article 31 is the most important provision of TRIPS concerning developing
countries and their fight for access to affordable pharmaceuticals. This is because it
allows for compulsory licensing under certain circumstances. It states that the
requirement of a patent "may be waived by a Member in the case of a national emergency
52 TRIPS, Annex IC.
53 TRIPS, 27(2)
54 TRIPS 27(3)(a)
55 John A. Harrelson, TRIPS, Pharmaceutical Patents, and the HIV/AIDS Crisis: Finding the Proper
Balance Between Intellectual Property Rights and Compassion, 7-SPG Widener L. Symp. J. 175, 180
(2001) (citing George K. Foster, Opposing Forces in a Revolution in International Patent Protection: The
U.S. and India in the Uruguay Round and its Aftermath, 3 UCLA J. INT'L L & FOR. AFF. 283, 283-84
(1998)).
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or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases of public non-commercial use." 56
However, this is not blanket authority to allow compulsory licenses. The Article sets out
a number of required conditions before and during the process of compulsory licensing.
57
For example, "the scope and duration of such use shall be limited to the purpose for
which is was authorized, 58 "such use shall be non-exclusive," 59 and "such use shall be
non-assignable."
60
The problem with this provision is that it has the practical effect of preventing
generic drug imports to countries without significant manufacturing industries.6 1 It states
"[a]ny such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market
of the Member authorizing such use." 62 Few developing countries meet the level of
production needed to produce significant amounts of generic drugs. Thus the only real
option for these countries is to import from other countries who have the ability to
manufacture generic drugs.63 However, should the country in need of drugs find another
Member state to export generic versions, this act of exporting would be a violation of
Section 31 (f)'s requirement "predominantly for the supply of the domestic market."
64
Therefore no Member country would realistically act as an exporter because it would
then be in violation of TRIPS.
Article 31 was so riddled with complications that is was essentially useless. The
lack of formal guidelines stipulating what qualifies as a "national health crisis" and what
56 TRIPS 3 1(b)
57 TRIPS 31
58 TRIPS 3 1(c)
59 TRIPS 27(d)
60 TRIPS 27(e)
61 Matthews, supra note 45, at 78.
62 TRIPS 27(f)
63 Matthews, supra note 45, at 78.
64 Id. at 82. See generally, TRIPS §3 1(f).
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things could be considered an "other circumstance[] or extreme urgency ' 65 opened it up
to a wide variety of interpretations as to its key provisions. Thus not only did WTO
countries disagree over the provisions' applications and practical effects, but just using
the system itself in most circumstances seems to be in violation of TRIPS itself.
IV. THE DOHA DECLARATION ON THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND PUBLIC
HEALTH
In November of 2001 the Ministerial Conference of the WTO gathered to discuss
Article 31 of TRIPS, specifically provision (f) which required the supply be
predominantly for the domestic market. 66 Before this Conference, developing countries
expressed concern that pressure from Western countries prevented them from using the
TRIPS flexibilities, especially the compulsory licensing provision. 67 While globally the
AIDS epidemic was recognized as a serious health crisis, there was no consensus
regarding the role patents and TRIPS should play. Those in favor of strong patent
protection tried to suggest other issues were to blame for the epidemic, such as
inadequate health care structures. 68 While this is admittedly part of the problem, public
campaigns by Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO's), the WHO, and the United
Nations helped the Council, and the world, view access to essential medicines as a right
to health.69
The Conference issued a November 14, 2001 Ministerial Declaration recognizing
"the particular vulnerability of the least-developed countries and the special structural
65 See TRIPS, 27(b)
66 Doha Declaration
67 Cynthia M. Ho, Biopiracy and Beyond: A Consideration of Socio-Cultural Conflicts with Global Patent
Policies, 39 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 433, 492-93 (Spring 2006).
68 Id. at 495 (citing Amir Attarran & Lee Gillespie-White, Do Patents on Antiretrovirals Drugs Constrain
Access to AIDS Treatment in Africa?, 286 JAMA 1886, 1890-91 (2001)).
69 Id. at 293 (citing Susan Sell, Private Power, Public Law 39-55 (2003)).
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difficulties they face in the global economy." 70 The Declaration stated the Counsel's
commitment "to addressing the marginalization of least-developed countries in
international trade and to improving their effective participation in the multilateral
trading system." 71 Further, the Declaration stated:
1. We recognize the gravity of the public health problems afflicting many
developing and least-developed countries, especially those resulting from
HIV/AIDS ...
4. We agree that the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent
members from taking measures to protect public health...
5. Accordingly... we recognize that these flexibilities include:
b. Each member has the right to grant compulsory licenses and the
freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licenses are
granted.
c. Each member has the right to determine what constitutes a national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency, it being
understood that public health crises, including those relating to
HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can represent a
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.
d. The effect of the provisions in the TRIPS Agreement that are
relevant to the exhaustion of intellectual property rights is to leave
each member free to establish its own regime for such exhaustion
without challenge
6. We recognize that WTO members with insufficient or no manufacturing
capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in making
effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement. We
instruct the Councilfor TRIPS to find an expeditious solution to this
problem and to report to the General Council before the end of 2002.72
(emphasis added)
The Doha Declaration thus implied no Member state was barred by TRIPS from doing
taking any necessary action to address national heath crises, of which AIDS was
70 Doha (3)
71 Doha (3)
72 Declaration on TRIPS
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specifically mentioned.73 The Declaration was met "with great enthusiasm and hailed as a
leap toward correcting the social injustice allegedly resulting from the high price of
patented drugs."
74
In paragraph six Doha recognized the inherent problem with Article 31 (f) because
Member countries without manufacturing capacities would not be able to use compulsory
licenses. The Ministers directed the TRIPS Council to come up with a solution to this
"Paragraph 6 Problem" by the end of 2002. 75 Thus started a series of negotiations. The
Declaration was not legally binding, but simply an interpretive statement issued by the
76WTO. However, it was regarded as persuasive authority in the event of a trade
dispute. 77 This brought to the negotiation table two distinct groups. One was the
pharmaceutical industry, who felt that Doha made too many concessions for developing
countries and ultimately undermined the TRIPS policy rationale. 78 The other was world
leaders and lobbying groups who thought Doha a good balance between international
intellectual property rights and the needs of developing countries.
79
73 Vishal Gupta, Note, A Mathematical Approach to Benefit-Detriment Analysis as a Solution to
Compulsory Licensing ofPharmaceuticals Under the TRIPS Agreement, 13 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L.
631, 642 (Fall 2005).
74 Haag, supra note 25, at 952.
7 Id. at 951-52.
76 See Understanding the WTO: The Agreements: Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement, at
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis-e/tif e/agrm7_e.htm.
77 Id.
78 Fayerman, supra note 51 (citing Peter N. Fowler & Alice T. Zalik, A U.S. Government Perspective
Concerning the Agreement on the Trade-Related Aspects on Intellectual Property: Past, Present, and Near
Future, 17 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 401 (2003)).
79Id. at 262 (citing Sara DeForge, Comment, A Tough Pill to Swallow: The United States' Passive Efforts
in Curtailing Intellectual Property Rights in Favor of Humanity, 4 LOY. L. & TECH. ANN. 75, 79 (2004)).
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V. IMPLEMENTATION OF PARAGRAPH 6 OF THE DOHA DECLARATION: THE
DECISION OF THE WTO GENERAL COUNCIL ON AUGUST 30,2003
On August 30, 2003, after several rounds of negotiations, the WTO finally approved a
waiver to Article 31 (f) of the TRIPS Agreement. This waiver allowed for
pharmaceuticals manufactured via compulsory licenses to be exported to developing
countries lacking sufficient production capabilities. 8' Thus, Member states were allowed
to effectively and legally export generic medicines to those countries unable to make the
drugs themselves.8 2 The waiver conditioned compulsory licenses as long as "used in good
faith to protect the public ... not [as] instrument to pursue industrial or commercial
policy objectives."8 3
The waiver included all patented products or products manufactured by a patented
process needed for public health problems stated in paragraph 1 of Doha.8 4 Therefore a
Member state could, as a result of a national emergency or other circumstance of extreme
urgency, legally use the compulsory licensing system to produce generic versions of
HIV/AIDS drugs.85 One area of concern with compulsory licenses is parallel importing.
This is when a product is placed in the market in one country and is subsequently
exported to a second country without the permission of the right holder, usually at a
higher price than originally bought for. To safeguard against this the waiver required that
generic compulsory licensed drugs be a different shape and color than patented drugs.
80 2003 WTO General Council Implementation of Paragraph Six of the Doha Declaration
81 id
82 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, available at
http://www.dep.no/ud/english/topics/trade/wto/doha/032121-120019/dok-bn.html (last updated July 14,
2006).
83 Mullenbach, supra note 1, at 245 (quoting WTO Votes to Bypass Patents on Medicines; Cheap Generics
Go to Poor Nations, WASH. POST, Aug. 31, 2003, at A16).
84 Matthews, supra note 45, at 95.
85 id.
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Also, procedures were put in place for the TRIPS Council to periodically review
licensing arrangements to check for abuse.
8 6
Procedurally, the Decision is quite complicated. In order to begin a compulsory
licensing scheme, the importing country must attempt to obtain a voluntary license from
the patent holder on reasonable commercial grounds for a reasonable period.87 Should
this fail, the importing country must access its generic industry's capacity to produce
such drugs locally. It that is found insufficient, the country must provide the WTO with a
detailed description of why this is so.88 Then the importing country must contact an
exporting country, which must in turn obtain a voluntary license. Should that not be
possible, the exporting country must receive a compulsory license from its government
on a single-country basis, with due compensation. 
9
As beneficial as the Declaration appears to developing countries, there are several
issues which make actual implementation quite difficult. As mentioned previously, the
importing country must comply with strict and complicated procedural requirements
which can be quite burdensome to an already overwhelmed developing country. Further,
there was still staunch opposition to this Declaration by developed countries. 90 While any
country in need could act as an importer, a list of developed Member countries have
pledged never to use the system, and did so at the signing of the Declaration. 91 Another
Id. at 96.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 See generally Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration of the TRIPS Agreement and
Public Health
90 Matthews, supra note 45, at 95.
91 These states include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain,
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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list of Members92 stated that if they were to use the system, it would only be in a situation
of national emergency or other urgent situation - thus implying that other Members
might use the system more liberally. 93 In addition, recent applicants to the EU, including
the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, the
Slovak Republic and Slovenia, have all agreed to act as importers only in situations of
national emergency or other extreme urgency situations. Once these countries become
official members of the EU they have pledged to never act as importers.
94
One could argue that the fact that certain countries pledged not to act as importers
does not pose a real problem because the countries did not say that they would never act
as exporters. However, importing is the essential component of compulsory licensing.
The system is based on the premise that a country has a large enough problem to justify
importing medicines from other countries. Exporting is just the means by which this is
accomplished. Thus, by specifically pledging not to act as importers, the countries are
essentially pledging to never act as exporters either. If they fundamentally disagree with
the proposition that there will ever be an emergency so great that a country should look to
other countries to import drugs from, they are certainly not going to act as an exporter for
another country to do just that.
Another problem with this waiver is the cost of procedural requirements
(specifically altering packaging, pill size and color). This added financial burden may
create negative effects regarding the availability of essential medicines in developing
countries. These provisions may reduce incentives for drug companies to make generic
92 These states include: Hong Kong, China, Israel, Kuwait, China, Mexico, Qatar, Singapore, Chinese
Taipei, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates.
93 Matthews, supra note 45, at 95.
Id. at 96.
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drugs because it is less cost-effective. 95 Further, all the regulations impose heavy
administrative burdens on countries which have several other pressing problems. In
addition, the Council's decision to periodically review compulsory licenses could further
result in lengthy delays and costs.
96
VI. THE DECEMBER 6,2005 AMENDMENT TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
On December 6, 2005 the WTO Council met again to discuss the issue brought about
by the Doha Declaration - Article 3 1(f) of the TRIPS Agreement. In the first time a core
WTO agreement has been amended, the Council made permanent the waiver of Article
31 (f) from August 30, 2003. Therefore any Member country may now legally export
pharmaceutical products made under a compulsory license, making it easier for
developing countries to access essential medicines. This Amendment will be formally
built into the TRIPS Agreement once 2/3 of Member countries ratify the change.
97
Members have until December 1, 2007, and the waiver will remain in effect until then.
98
Director-General Pascal Lamy said, "[t]he agreement to amend the TRIPS provisions
confirms once again that members are determined to ensure the WTO's trading system
contributes to humanitarian and development goals .... 99
This decision came a week after WTO members agreed to allow least-developed
countries a longer transition period to provide protection for intellectual property rights in
general by extending the deadline to July 1, 2013.10 Yet, even with all the protections
and exceptions the WTO is making for least-developed countries, there is no guarantee
95 id.
96 Id.
97 WTO Press Release, Members OK Amendment to Make Health Flexibility Permanent, Dec. 6, 2005,
available at http://www.wto.org/English/news_e/pres05 e/pr426_e.htm.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
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that these countries will actually be able to obtain the patented medicines. As with the
2003 exception, the 2005 Amendment contains lists of countries who pledge not to ever
act as importers, and even more countries pledging only to do so in cases of extreme
national emergency.101
That pharmaceutical companies, and not those working towards allowing compulsory
licensing such as Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO), were pleased with the
amendment 102 says quite a bit. M~decins Sans Frontibres (Medicine Without Borders), an
NGO, disapproved of the decision because it was "based on a mechanism that has failed
to prove it can increase access to medicines." It further said that the original 2003
decision was "overly cumbersome and inefficient" because it is based on a "drug-by-
drug, country-by-country decision-making process," and in adopting it the WTO was
"ignoring the day-to-day reality of drug production and procurement."'
10 3
VII. PHARMACEUTICAL COMPANIES AND THE ROLE OF US LOBBIES
WTO Members may, but are not required to, grant intellectual property protection in
excess of what TRIPS requires. 104 As one of the most influential TRIPS Members, the
United States has attempted several bilateral and multilateral treaties with countries to
prevent them from granting compulsory licenses. 105 The US economy is moving from
manufacturing to high-technology industries, and therefore protecting intellectual
property rights is an important concern. 10 6 The pharmaceutical industry constitutes a large
101 Id.
102 Tove Iren S. Gerhardsen, TRIPS Health Amendment Evokes Harsh NGO Reaction, Industry Caution,
http://www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p169&res1024&print0 (Dec. 12, 2005)
103[d
104 See generally TRIPS
105 Harrelson, supra note 55, at 183 (citing Robert Weissman, In Focus: AIDS and Developing Countries:
Democratizing Access to Essential Medicines, at http:// www.foreignpolicy-
infocus.org/briefs/vol4/v4n23aids.html (Aug. 1999)).
106 Id.
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part of the industrial base of the US, and receives 40% of its income from the export of
pharmaceuticals. 10 7 Further, almost half of all commercial pharmaceutical drugs
developed in the last twenty years were developed in the US. 10 8
Because of the above mentioned, the US often threatens trade sanctions upon
countries who attempt to use compulsory licensing. 109 This is done under the authority of
Section 301 Powers, 1 which allow the President to designate countries practicing unfair
foreign trade practices that negatively affect US trade and investment in goods and
services."' It "is the principal statutory authority under which the United States may
impose trade sanctions against foreign countries that maintain acts, policies and practices
that violate, or deny U.S. rights or benefits under, trade agreements, or are unjustifiable,
unreasonable or discriminatory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce." 112 Further,
pharmaceutical companies often actively fund political campaigns and public action
committees. 113 This gives them the ability to influence government policy in regards to
their interests, specifically patent protection. 114
One example of the use of §301 powers and the effect of pharmaceutical companies
on US government policy is South Africa. In 1998 it's government passed a law allowing
the manufacture of generic HIV and AIDS drugs. This prompted the pharmaceutical
industry to complain to the US government, which in turn put South Africa on the
107 Id. at 183.
108 Id.
109 See, e.g., Harrelson, supra note 55, at 184.
110 The Trade Act of 1974, 19 U.S.C. § 2411 (1974)
11Harrelson, supra note 55, at 184 n.90.
112 Jean Heilman Grier, Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act, at http://www.osec.doc.gov/ogc/occic/301.html.
113 Harrelson, supra note 55, at 184-84.
114 Id.
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"Section 301" watch list, one step above trade sanctions. 115 However, developing county
rights activists strongly protested, and in September of 1999 the US government
responded to this pressure by taking South Africa off the list,116 although they continue to
monitor them closely for violations of TRIPS. 117 Pharmaceutical representatives made
several strong statements against the actions of South Africa. For example, Jeffrey
Trewhitt, a spokesman for the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America,
said the new South African laws "are attacks on legitimate patent protection, which is the
lifeblood of this industry .... This could set a very, very bad precedent that could
undermine legitimate patent protection around the world. The potential harm from these
recent developments can be expected to reach into many other developing countries."
118
However, despite reluctance to be involved in the compulsory licensing debate,
pharmaceutical companies are feeling pressured. Investors frequently urge companies to
improve access to medicines in developing countries. 119 Investors want to put money in
companies that balance sensitivity to the global AIDS epidemic and the enforcement of
patent rights. 12 In response to these pressures some companies have donated drugs to
developing countries for free. 12 1 Complicating matters, however, is the fact that many
sub-Saharan countries in great need refuse to accept these medicines. Problems of
political commitment, shortcomings in local healthcare systems, and problems with
115 Id. at 185 (citing Karl Vick, African AIDS Victims Losers of A Drug War: U.S. Policy Keeps Prices
Prohibitive, Wash. Post, Dec. 4, 1999, at Al).
116 Id at 185 n. 93.
"7 Id (citing Simon Barber, Stars and Stripes: To Whom are the Battle of Seattle NGOs Accountable?,
Business Day (South Africa), Jan. 20, 2000, at 2, available at 2000 WL 7449976).
11 Id (citing Mike McKee, Tripping over TRIPS: A Court Battle in South Africa Over AIDS Drug Imports
Could Threaten the Most Comprehensive Multilateral Trade Agreement on IP Rights to Date, The Recorder
(San Francisco), Sept. 1999, at S20).
119 Matthews, supra note 45, at 98.
120 Id
121 Id
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distribution all cannot be solved by free medicine. This could be why countries are
refusing to accept the free drugs. 122 This illustrates that simply giving medicine away is
not the answer to the AIDS crisis. More needs to be more done within developing
countries themselves. Should these countries feel as though once they accept the
medicine they will also receive help to distribute it, medical and health services for their
public to ensure the proper use of those medications, and other such help it seems logical
to conclude they would accept the drugs.
VIII. CURRENT OPTIONS: COMPULSORY LICENSING AFTER THE 2003 DOHA
DECLARATION AND THE 2005 TRIPS AMENDMENT
a. THE GOOD VS. THE BAD ABOUT COMPULSORY LICENSES
b. THE GOOD
There are several positive aspects to compulsory licenses and their ability to help
combat the HIV/AIDS crisis in developing countries. For one, the price of most AIDS-
related drugs could be reduced anywhere from 50-90% by generic drug versions
manufactured via compulsory licenses. 123 The problem with this approach is that if the
average country only spends about $10 a person on health care, the lowered costs of these
medicines still will not be low enough to be affordable.
Another positive aspect is that pharmaceutical companies could still make a
profit, and thus continue to have incentives to research and develop new drugs. One 1999
UK study found that lowering prices on drugs to developing countries would seriously
threaten profits or research and development of pharmaceutical companies. This is
122 Id.
123 Someshwar Singh, Compulsory Licensing Good for US Public, Not Others, Third World Network,
http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/public-cn.htm (citing Aids, Health, Trade and Compulsory Licensing, The
Corner House (Eng.) (Oct. 1999).
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because lower prices equal increased sales from developing countries in addition to the
steady stream of drugs needed in the developed countries where people can pay full
price. 124 Also, the compulsory licensing program calls for patent owners to receive
"adequate remuneration. 125" Therefore, reasonable fees paid for compulsory licenses,
combined with the amount of profit pharmaceutical companies are making already,
should not cause significant financial harm. Generic versions further expand profit
margins because they open markets in regions of the world that otherwise would not be
considered.
However, the real value of compulsory licensing is not actual use, but instead
threat of use. 126 Compulsory licenses are a tool for developing countries to use in
negotiations with pharmaceutical companies to try and secure reasonable prices for
HIV/AIDS medications.127 Forcing pharmaceutical companies to face a choice between a
compulsory license or making a deal, makes its threat a valid and useful bargaining chip
for developing countries - many of whom who have nothing else on their side. In fact,
"the mere threat of compulsory license[] may often be as, of not more, effective in
achieving public policy objectives than actual use." 128
c. THE BAD
However, compulsory licenses themselves cannot solve the whole problem. In
reality, while compulsory licensing is an option for developing countries, it is rarely used.
Many countries are hesitant to use the system out of respect for the international patent
124 Id.
125 TRIPS, §31(h)
126 Matthews, supra note 45, at 81.
127 Id.
121 Id. (citing Jerome H. Reichman & Catherine Hasenzahl, Non-voluntary Licensing of Patented
Invemtions: Historical Perspective, Legal Framework under TRIPS, and an Overview of the Practice in
Canada and the United States of America (Case Study for UNCTAD/ICTSD Capacity Building Project on
Intellectual Property Rights and Sustainable Development, 2002)).
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system, as well as to not anger Western companies who could provide their country with
new investment and technology. 129 It has been said that the "velvet handcuffs of
international custom and comity are [so] strong" they prevent any action by developing
countries that could result in angering those who could possibly give money and
resources.1 30 Developing countries are starved for foreign capital, and their desire to
attract foreign investment understandably makes them wary of applying for compulsory
licenses. Pressure from the US and other countries and groups with great power often
successfully prevent countries from using the compulsory licensing system. 131 While the
2005 TRIPS Amendment is a step in the right direction for these countries, the WTO
needs to make a stronger stand on the issue and ensure developing countries are
realistically able to use the system should they decide to without significant harm.
Second, as mentioned previously, HIV/AIDS drugs need to be taken on a very
specific schedule, the interruption of which can cause mutations and resistance. 132
Therefore, the fact that compulsory licensing is not a long term solution renders it
unrealistic as a viable solution. Further, licenses are granted for specific quantities and
specific durations. 133 Because developing countries often have infrastructure problems,
most of them simply do not have the internal systems in place to adequately navigate
through all the red tape required in applying and receiving compulsory licenses. Even
countries which have industries in place to produce generic drugs quite possibly do not
have enough government organization to make application feasible.
129 Fayerman, supra note 51, at 265.
130 Id. at 265-66 (citing Amir Attaran, Assessing and Answering Paragraph 6 f the Doha Declaration on
the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health: The Case for Greater Flexibility and a Non-Justicability
Solution, 17 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 743, 750 (2003)).
131 Matthews, supra note 45, at 95.
132 AIDSMeds.com, Things You Should Know Before Starting Treatment,
http://www.aidsmeds.com/lessons/StartHere5.htm (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).
133 See generally TRIPS §31
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Third, using compulsory licenses to combat public health issues may harm the
potential of creating more innovative national policies. If a country without
manufacturing capabilities can rely on other countries to import medicines from, there is
no incentive for that country to create its own industry to sustain itself in the long-term.
Further, because Western countries and industries strongly oppose compulsory licensing,
using the system discourages direct foreign investment and the transfer of technology. 1
34
Without help from wealthier countries in the form of investment or technology
developing countries will lack the ability to create their own manufacturing capabilities
even if they wish to do so.
Fourth, the added costs of changing packaging, color, and size under TRIPS
135
might have a negative effect on developing countries. These costs could reduce
incentives for generic-drug companies who might decide it is not cost-effective to make
special pills just for compulsory licenses. 136 These companies may determine it is not
economically viable to spend so much making special looking pills for a low profit.
Fifth, there are huge administrative costs and burdens associated with obtaining a
compulsory license.137 Should a country decide to use the system, it must contact and
make specific arrangements with an exporting country for specific quantities of drugs and
for specific time periods. Then the WTO must be notified, and administrative
proceedings must be undertaken, to assure compliance with TRIPS. Further, the country
134Matthews, supra note 45, at 80.
135 See generally TRIPS §31
136 Matthews, supra note 45, at 96.
137 See generally TRIPS §31
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will have to undergo WTO scrutiny to determine if it is, in fact, using the system
properly. All of this results in long delays and is quite costly.13
8
Sixth, intellectual property protection benefits developing countries in a number
of ways quite possibly more in line with the purposes of TRIPS than compulsory
licensing. Pharmaceutical companies, who are consistently on the Fortune 500 List, 139 are
businesses out to make money. They thus require strong incentives to research and
develop new and improved medicines, especially for diseases that primarily affect
individuals in developing countries. 14 It is argued that "the first step in combating a
public health crisis is to ensure that the essential medicines exist before the pricing of
such drugs becomes an issue."
141
d. Is DOHA ENOUGH?
Doha is important not only because it provided a basis for compulsory licensing,
but because it was an "important catalyst" to alert the world of the magnitude of the
HIV/AIDS epidemic. 142 It helped spur action by corporate donors and public-private
initiatives, and increased donations to international organizations dealing with the
HIV/AIDS epidemic. 143 Doha essentially helped shift attention away from perceived
losses of the pharmaceutical industry and instead put a face on the global crisis for many.
Doha's importance lies in the fact that it reaffirmed and emphasized that a line
needed to be drawn between protecting intellectual property rights and social welfare. It
138 Matthews, supra note 45, at 96.
139 See Fortune 500, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/full-list/ (last visited
Oct. 31, 2006).
140 Fayerman, supra note 5 1, at 270.
141 Id. (quoting Keith E. Maskus, Ensuring Access to Essential Medicines: Some Economic Considerations,
20 WIS. INT'L L.J. 563, 568 (2002)).
142 Matthews, supra note 45, at 75.
143 Id.
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specifically stated that "the TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent members
from taking measures to protect public health.' ' 44 It spurred change in the national patent
laws of many countries, including the US. 145 Basically, "least-developed and developing
nations gained affirmations of the right to use compulsory licenses on independent terms,
while developed nations received affirmations of the importance of patent protection."'
146
However, there are several problems with Doha and its resulting Amendment to
TRIPS. For one, the scope of diseases for which compulsory licensing is applicable has
yet to be defined.147 For example, there is nothing that says a national emergency has to
be a result of an epidemic. 148 Further, each Member state is free to decide what qualifies
as "public health crisis."'149 Pharmaceutical companies and those in favor of strong
intellectual rights protection are already wary of the compulsory licensing scheme; the
lack of clear definitions in regards to when the system is legally applicable complicates
the situation even more. In order to balance both social rights and patent protection under
compulsory licensing, there needs to be clear definitions of what is applicable and what is
not. If this is not done, inconsistent application of provisions will result, causing greater
tension among those for and against the system. 15 It is simply unreasonable to believe a
majority of countries will, in actual practice, support this system without clarification.
Compulsory licensing, whether clearly defined or not, poses the very real risk that
pharmaceutical companies will decide it is economically infeasible to spend millions of
144 Doha, paragraph 4
145 Mullenbach, supra note 1, at 242-43.
146 Gupta, Note, supra note 73, at 633 (citing Arnoldo Lacayo, Seeking a Balance: International
Pharmaceutical Protection Public Health Crisis, and the Emerging Threat of Bio-Terrorism, 33 U. MIAMI
INTER-AM. L. REV. 295, 317 (2002)).
147 Matthews, supra note 45.
148 See generally TRIPS § 31
149 Gupta, supra note 73, at 647.
150 Id.
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dollars in research and development on medicines for diseases and specific stands of
diseases primarily affecting developing countries when they will get very little in
return. 151 If the companies realize a strong probability exists that their patents will get
compulsory licensed, and they will thus receive little if any compensation for their work,
they might be inclined to not spend time on developing the drugs to begin with. 1
52
Further, individual countries are allowed complete discretion over restrictions and
punishments applicable to parallel importation. 153 It is not unreasonable for this to make
pharmaceutical companies wary that their lower cost or compulsory licensed drugs will
be resold in different markets. This may cause companies to air on the side of caution
when deciding how much time and money to invest in the development of HIV/AIDS
drugs.
Finally, the United States and other key Western powers actively fight against Doha
and compulsory licensing. Many countries have already signed agreements not to
participate in the compulsory licensing system, 154 and there is no reason for this to
change in the future. Developing countries may feel pressure to sign onto such
agreements in order to avoid losing access to developed markets. 155 While the HIV/AIDS
epidemic is in need of immediate attention in developing countries, their governments
may decide that overall it would be better not to isolate themselves from Western
markets.
151 TRIPS requires "adequate remuneration" (TRIPS Article 31bis). Matthews, supranote45, at 105.
152 Matthews, supra note 45, at 105.
153 Gupta, supra note 73, at 649.
154 Matthews, supra note 45, at 105.
155 Id. at 105-106
Sprinz 2007
Richmond Journal of Law and the Public Interest
IX. CURRENT OPTIONS: OTHER SOLUTIONS
Unfortunately there is no easy answer to the global HIV/AIDS epidemic. As
illustrated above, the compulsory licensing system is a step by the international
community in the right direction. It has alerted the world to the very real issue of AIDS
and for the need of an international movement to combat the problem. However it alone
is simply not enough. There are too many ambiguities in the system, and too much
opposition to the way it currently works. Therefore, other solutions need to be
considered.
a. PARALLEL IMPORTATION AND TIERED DRUG PRICING
An alternative way to provide HIV/AIDS drugs to developing countries without
going through the compulsory licensing system is simply for pharmaceutical companies
to provide cheaper drugs for those countries in need of them.156 Tiered drug pricing is a
system in which drug companies charge different prices in different markets, thus
allowing those less-able to pay to have a lower cost. This ultimately means that
"pharmaceutical companies can maintain their price and profit structures in wealthy
countries while allowing the developing world access to needed medicines."'157 This
system is attractive for pharmaceutical companies because they can retain their ability to
license their products to someone of their choosing. Further, it allows them to maintain
full control over the product they invested so much time and money developing.15
8
The problem with this is the doctrine of the exhaustion of rights, which is when an
intellectual property owner loses, or exhausts, certain rights after the first use of his
156 Id. at 99.
157 Fayerman, supra note 51, at 272 (citing Alan 0. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing
Countries, and the Doha "Solution. " 3 CHI. J. INT'L L. 47, 63 (2002)).158 Id
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patent.159 The relevant TRIPS Agreement provision states that a patentee's rights are
exhausted as soon as the patented product is put on the market with his consent."0 Doha
affirmed this in saying each Member is "free to establish its own regime for such
exhaustion without challenge."' 161 Thus, in the context on parallel imports, once the right
holder agrees to put their product into a certain market, their rights to that product are
lost. Once a pharmaceutical company agrees to and provides a developing country with
lower priced drugs, they have no control over what happens to the drugs once delivered.
Therefore it would be completely legal for the developing country to resell the drugs in a
higher priced market. There would be nothing the pharmaceutical company could do to
stop that country's actions because their rights would be already exhausted. 162
The possibility of parallel importing undermines the willingness of
pharmaceutical companies to make deals with developing companies on lower drug costs.
Because of this there needs to be some sort of international consensus on the exhaustion
of rights to combat this problem. The best course of action would be to amend the TRIPS
Agreement to reflect a change in parallel importation laws, such as imposing minimum
standards so all countries have a basic level of protection. If accomplished, it would go a
long way in assisting developing countries ability to negotiate with pharmaceutical
companies.
159 Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exhaustion of rights.
160 TRIPS, art. 6
161 Doha, 5(d)
162 Matthews, supra note 45, at 99.
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b. OTHER AREAS OF POSSIBILITIES
1. FORGIVENESS OF DEBT
Another option, and one proposed by the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund, is debt relief. 163 This entails forgiving debts of the poorest countries with
conditions such as surplus money must be spent on buying essential patented
medicines. 64 To ensure the actual purchase of medicine, the money would be transferred
to the Bank, and it would then purchase the necessary drugs. 1
65
While this sounds like a plausible solution, it does not guarantee health will
necessarily improve in developing countries. While it would supply money for certain
drugs, it does not guarantee enough money to buy all the supplies developing countries
actually need to combat the HIV/AIDS crisis. Further, unless there is nationwide
continuous treatment, there is nothing to stop the spread of infection. Nor is this a long-
term solution, which is both needed to provide incentives for pharmaceutical companies
to continue research and development of new drugs, and what those affected by
HIV/AIDS needed to be effectively treated. 166
2. INCENTIVES
A third potential possibility is to provide pharmaceutical companies with financial
incentives to gain cooperation on lowering drug prices. These companies are in the
business of making money, thus presenting them with financial incentives is a sure way
163 Jillian Clare Cohen and Patricia Illingworth, Pharmaceutical Patents and International Commitments:
The Inherent Tensions and Implications for Public Health, May 30-June 1, 2003, available at
http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/paper-2003/cohen-illingworth.pdf.
164 Matthews, supra note 45, at 100 (quoting Marco M. Slotbloom, The Exhaustion of Intellectual Property
Rights: Different Approaches in EC and WTO Law, 6(3) J. World Intell. Prop. 421, 423 (2003)).
164 Cohen, supra note 164.
165 Id.
166 Id. (citing J. Sachs, Submission to the Senate Subcommittee on African Affairs, Washington, Feb. 24,
2000)).
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to at least get their attention. The best example of this is tax breaks. 167 Countries, by
offering tax incentives, may spawn innovation in research and development, as the US
does successfully with the Orphan Drug Bill.
168
This way, even if it would not necessarily be profitable for pharmaceutical companies
to research and develop drugs specifically dealing with the HIV/AIDS crisis, or to
provide countries in need with lower prices medicines, they would still benefit in the way
of tax cuts. While it seems implausible that this alone can solve the problem, it is a step in
the right direction. An international agreement on tax incentives would be a win-win
situation for both pharmaceutical companies and countries in need. In dealing with such a
large epidemic it is important to not rely on one method alone to create change, but to
institute a number of small changes which together create a powerful solution.
c. COULD THESE SOLUTIONS BE ENOUGH?
One could argue that these solutions, if combined, could be enough to combat the
HIV/AIDS epidemic until drugs come off patent protection. Once off patent, drugs enter
a capitalist market with competition, which naturally lowers prices. Also, generic drugs
do not need to factor research and development costs into their prices. However, as
explained earlier, older drugs are simply not as effective as newer drugs. Issues of
resistance make using older drugs more of a problem than a solution. The HIV disease
changes often. 169 Thus, "when this happens, the drug no longer controls virus growth
167The Orphan Drugs Bill, H.R. 4014 (2002)
http://www.usmedicine.com/article.cfm?articlelD-562&issuelD-45
168 Bill Boosts Orphan Drug Research Grant Program, U.S. Medicine, Dec. 2002,
http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/intelprp/industry.htm (This U.S. law, administered by the Food and
Drug Administration, deals with medications used to treat diseases and conditions that rarely occur. Since
there is little financial incentive for the pharmaceutical industry to develop such medications, "orphan drug
status" gives a manufacturer specific financial incentives to develop and provide such medications.)
169 Merrill Hayden, Drug resistance and HIV, Yahoo! Health.com,
http://health.yahoo.com/topic/hiv/resources/article/healthwise/tm6300, June 17, 2005.
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(replication) or protects the immune system" and it is necessary to change medications. 170
By the time drugs come off patent there is a likely possibility most are resistant to them,
and hence the drugs are essentially worthless to a large portion of the HIV/AIDS infected
population.
X. PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS - THE FUTURE
After examining current patent law regarding the HIV/AIDS crisis, including
compulsory licensing, tougher parallel importation laws and tax incentives, it becomes
clear that these alone cannot solve the global problem. The option this paper will suggest
is public-private partnerships. These partnerships offer the best overall solution. For one,
not only are they able to work well under current international patent law without using
compulsory licensing, but these organizations are able to encourage pharmaceutical
companies with financial incentives. Second, the organizations address several other
issues involved in the HIV/AIDS crisis. These include the need for health care systems
within developed countries, access to educated and informed medical personnel and
capable distribution systems.
Public-private partnerships are comprised of international organizations, international
companies, non-governmental organizations, private organizations, and countries. The
greatest strength of organizations such as these is their ability to coordinate contributions
and programs, thus increasing efficiency for all involved. This also allows for cost-
sharing, a benefit which all appreciate. Another unique aspect of these partnerships is
their dedication to working with organizations that already have established
infrastructures and are currently involved in affected communities. A central
organizational structure reduces administrative problems and decreases time delays.
170 Id
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Further, because it allows each organization to provide "unique expertise and core
competencies" the overall result is well-rounded organizations able to competently
address several different areas of concern effectively and in conjunction. 171
This paper will briefly summarize the works and benefits of three main organizations:
UNAIDS, The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria, and UNITAID.
a. MAIN ORGANIZATIONS
b. UNAIDS
UNAIDS is a Joint United Nations program which includes the efforts and
resources often UN organizations. 172 UNAIDS was established in 1994 by a resolution of
the UN Economic and Social Council and officially launched in January 1996.173 It is co-
sponsored by such organizations as the World Bank and the World Health
Organization. 174 While based in Geneva, the UNAIDS secretariat works in more than 75
countries worldwide. 1
75
UNAIDS is "committed to strengthening support to nationally owned and led
responses." 176 Because of all their co-sponsors, UNAIDS is able to ensure better
coordination among the UN, governments, civil society, donors, and the private sector. 177
Thus its most important role is that of an organizer to ensure that all the different groups
of sectors which need to work together do. "Together we are committed to making the
171 USAID, HIV/AIDS Public-Private Partnerships, available at
http://www.usaid.gov/our work/global healthlaids/Partnerships/partnerships brief.html.
172 UNAIDS, About, http://www.unaids.org/en/AboutUNAIDS/default.asp.
173 UNAIDS, Governance, http://www.unaids.org/en/AboutUNAIDS/Govemance/default.asp.
174 Also: UNHOR, UNICEF, WFP, UNDP, UNFPA, UNODC, and UNESCO.
175 About, supra note 173.
176 UNAIDS in Action, http://www.unaids.org/en/Coordination/default.asp.
17 7 Id.
Sprinz 2007
Richmond Journal of Law and the Public Interest
money work for those who are in the most need today - while ensuring long term
solutions are in place for tomorrow."
178
UNAIDS develops, disseminates and monitors the implementation of HIViAIDS
policies all around the world 179 it guides developing countries in creating effective
programs to deal with social, political, culture, medical, health, and economic issues 1 0 it
encourages policies which not only include national govenmnents. but community and
faith based organizations and groups of people which include those living with
HIViAIDS. 1 It understands that in order for its policies to be effective it needs to be
"dynamic, comprehensive, [and] inforimed by evidence and information gathered through
experience, and oriented towards acknowledging and encouraging the role of different
stakeholders ' '192 UNAIDS tends to focus on what it finds the crucial issues confronting
the HIV/AIDS epidemic- HIV prevention, testing, and the "vulnerability of young people
who are increasingly and disproportionately affected by HIV. ' 1
3
The really great thing about this organization is it's connections to key
international organizations such as the World Bank and the World Health Organization.
This allows UNAIDS to have more influence thin a less connected group. Also, its key
issues not only focus on the treatment of HIViAIDS, but its prevention - the one thing
that compulsory licensing is simply not equipped to deal with. Prevention is a long term
goal, and in order for this to be realistic there needs to be more done to help developing
countries than just simply donating drug's.
178 Id.
179 Id.
180 UNAIDS, Policy, http://www.unaids.org/en/Policies/default.asp.
181 Id.
182 Id.
183 Id.
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c. THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS,
TUBERCULOSIS, AND MALARIA
The Global Fund is a partnership between governments, civil society, the private
sector, and affected communities. 8 4 The purpose of the Global Fund "is to attract,
manage and disperse resources to fight AIDS ... [it] do[es] not implement programs,
relying instead on the knowledge of local experts."' 8 5 The main objective of the Global
Fund is to work as a financing mechanism. The group works with "Closely with other
multilateral an1d bilateral organizations ilvolVed in ihetlth and development issues to
ensure that newly funded programs are coordin'ated with existing ones. - 1 The Glbl
Fund tries to incorporate their work with local existing fin'ncitl institutions when
possible to help developing countries build their own working systems instead of relying
un other aountries. IV7
The Glbl Fund was created 11 2001 to fin'ance prograns for epidemics in
developing countries.s% it only finriaces programns that will not replace or reduce "Lily
other sources of funding 1 9 Is seeks to "complement the finance of other donors and to
use its own grants to catalyze additional investments by donors and by recipients
themselves.' 9 Since 2001, the Global Fund has ensured $4 7 billion worth of financing
through 2008. Through its first two rounds of grants, it has committed S .5 billion to
support 154 prograns in 93 countries 191
184 How the Global Fund Works, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/about/how/.
185 Id.
186 id.
187 id.
181 See generally The Global Fund, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/
189 id.
190 How the Global Fund Works, supra note 185.
191 Id.
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Over the past five years, Global Fund resources have made a real impact upon the
HIV/AIDS epidemic. Because of it, 1.8 m hion people Iare projeted to have access to
IntlIretroviraI treatmet 192 ,4re thn a millon orphans will have medical services,
education, and corfnunity care 193 F rther, 62 mihllon people will have access to
vdLunta'ry counsehng and testing servics. 194
This partnership is key to the fight against HIV/AIDS because of the financial
contributions and organization it provides worldwide for those in need. As mentioned
before, a problem with compulsory licensing is that while it is a step in the right
direction, it offers no long term realistic solution. The Global Fund works with
developing countries to create effective economic programs, thus providing much needed
financial support while also providing much needed, and important, overall infrastructure
support. Partnerships like the Global Fund have far reaching effects because of its ability
to integrate all levels of government and society.
d. UNITAID
UNITAID launched its partnership on September 16, 2006 at the Opening Session
of the United Nations General Assembly.195 It was originally created by France, Brazil,
Chile, Norway, and the United Kingdom to create an international drug purchase facility
to be financed with predictable and consistent resources. 196 Currently there are 44
countries working on implementing UNITAID financial mechanisms. 197 In addition,
UNITAID is supported by many key global institutions such as the World Health
192 The Global Fund, Fighting AIDS, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/about/aids/default.asp.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 UNITAID's Core Principals, http://www.unitaid.eu/EN-Inutaid-unis-pour-soigner.html.
196 Id.
197 Id.
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Organization, UNAIDS, The Global Fund, NGO's, private foundations (like the Clinton
and Gates Foundations), and especially by the World Trade Organization.198 In a
statement by the WTO it said, "[lt]he World Health Organization welcomes the official
launch ofUNITAID... WTO shares the key public health objectives of UNITAID as it
seeks to assist developing countries in purchasing medicines .... 199
UNITAID seeks to implement a financing mechanism around the world that will
increase the supply of HIV/AIDS medicines while lowering their prices, without
compromising their quality.200 Because the program creates stable and continuing
financial contributions, UNITAIDS can guarantee long term financial help for large-scale
treatment programs. 201 Its goal is to achieve universal access to healthcare by 2010.202
The purpose of UNITAID is not to replace any other organization, but offer others an
innovative financing system.
203
UNITAID is based on a new idea: it proposes a levy tax on airline travel with
proceeds going into a fund used to purchase medicine from pharmaceutical companies.
204
Thus, it assures a long-term solution to the need for funding. "Air transport is one of the
industries that benefits most from globalization with an average annual growth of 5%...
[u]sing differentiated rates according to the travel classes ensures that efforts are
distributed fairly among passengers. '"
20 5
198 Id.
199 WIO, Media Center, WTO Welcomes Launch of UNITAID,
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2006/s15 /en/index.html
200 UNITAID's Core Principals, supra note 196.
201 Id.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 UNITAID, Innovating Financing Mechanism, http://www.unitaid.eu/EN-Mode-de-fmancement-
innovant.htm I.
205 Id.
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UNITAID has the ability to be an incredible help in the fight against HIV/AIDS.
Because it will be able to guarantee long term and predictable profit, it will have
substantial leverage with pharmaceutical companies. "UNITAID will negotiate multi-
year large-volume procurement programs with the pharmaceutical companies to obtain
significant cost reductions. Meanwhile UNITAID will boost the marketing of generic
drugs by accelerating their WHO pre-qualification and facilitating their distribution in
developing countries." 20 6 Thus, pharmaceutical companies will have an incentive to
increase the production of essential HIV/AIDS drugs for use in developing countries.
207
b. WHY THESE ORGANIZATIONS OFFER A REAL
SOLUTION AND CAN WORK WITHIN THE
PATENT SYSTEM
It is estimated that it will be at least another next two decades before there is a
substantial decline in HIV and AIDS infections. 20 Therefore, long term solutions are the
only realistic option. The Doha Declaration and the subsequent 2005 amendment to
TRIPS to allow compulsory licensing are crucial to the global fight against HIV and
AIDS. However, these alone will not be enough to solve the problem because they offer
only short term solutions without any permanent effects. The unique thing about public-
private partnerships is that they can work within the already established international
patent system without the need for compulsory licenses. Further, because of the wide
range of organizations represented, these partnerships can address a much wider array of
206 UNITAID/IDPF Added Value, http://www.unitaid.eu/EN-Valeur-ajoutee-Unitaid-FIAM.html.
207 Id.
208 Associated Press, Bush: AIDS 'Can Be Defeated', MSNBC, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id 15971729/
December 1, 2006.
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issues involved in the HIV/AIDS crisis then simply providing medication to some of
those in need.
The large amount of money these partnerships can raise is far more helpful to the
global fight on HIV and AIDS than individual compulsory licenses. These foundations
can make deals with pharmaceutical companies so both sides win. The pharmaceutical
companies make more money because of the increased demand, and developing countries
can receive lower cost drugs because of that increase in sales. All of this can occur
without the need to violate established patent laws, or anger developed countries. While
the threat of a compulsory license is in itself a motivator for companies to reduce prices
on their patented medicines, the sheer amount of profit they could make by negotiating
deals on large orders from organizations like the three mentioned above is much more of
an incentive. In the case of public-private partnerships everyone wins. Pharmaceutical
companies are allowed to maintain control of their patents and make a profit from them,
and developing countries are allowed access to the essential medicines their populations
so desperately need at lower prices without any huge administrative or financial burdens.
In order to fully take advantage of the benefits public-private partnerships offer,
there should be more integration among them. One of the unique benefits of such
organizations is their ability to pull together several different groups. Expanding on that
notion, large global partnerships like the three mentioned above should pool their
resources and work together. This was assure no overlap in their activities, and better
serve the overall purpose of benefiting those in need. One option would be for private
agreements between the organizations. Because they represent a wide variety of
organizations it is realistic to assume the partnerships would want to maintain a high level
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of individual control. However, with agreements it would be possible to carve out special
areas which each partnership could agree to concentrate on, and assure that all their other
activities function in conjunction with each other. Further, private agreements between
the organizations would increase their bargaining power in regards to pharmaceutical
companies. Should they all pool their resources and funding, pharmaceutical companies
will have no choice but bargain with groups because of the sheer amount of business
represented.
Another benefit of private agreements among partnerships is that this would allow
more resources to be used on other areas needing attention, such as the need for
developing countries to have access to food, clean water, adequate health care,
distribution systems, and overall national infrastructures to deal with the large scale of the
HIV/AIDS epidemic. All of these organizations by themselves focus on creating
programs to deal with issues such as these, and have been successful. By pooling their
resources and working together, the number of programs could dramatically increase. It is
likely each partnership has a specialty in regards to these types of programs. Through
agreement, each partnership could agree to work primarily on their specialty, with
economic and administrative help from the other partnerships. This would increase
productivity while lowering costs and associated administrative and time delays.
CONCLUSION
Overall, in order to effectively fight the global war on HIV/AIDS, there needs to
be a balance between the public interest and the need to incentivize pharmaceutical
companies research and development with profits. Allowing compulsory licensing alone
will not solve the problem for several reasons. For one, it is a short term solution that
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offers no real incentives for pharmaceutical companies. Second, it offers no realistic
solution to the other issues which need to be addressed, such as the need for food, water,
health services, distribution centers and so on within the HIV and AIDS infected
countries. There need to be other systems in place to motivate pharmaceutical companies
and create and build up structures within developing countries to create long-term
change.
The TRIPS Agreement was implemented in order to "promote effective and
adequate protection of intellectual property rights," and recognized "the underlying
policy objectives of national systems for the protection of intellectual property, including
developmental and technological objectives" as well as "the special needs of the least-
developed Member states in respect of maximum flexibility in the domestic
implementation of laws and regulations in order to enable them to create a sound and
viable technological base." 20 9 There are valid arguments, discussed previously, that
advance the idea that compulsory licensing is contrary to the above stated goals. That
while there is a need to protect and help developing countries, this should not be done at
the expense of the purpose of TRIPS -to protect intellectual property rights. The Doha
Declaration and the 2005 TRIPS Amendment were needed to provide leverage for
developing countries and public-private partnerships against pharmaceutical companies
in their quest for lower drug costs, but they were not meant to impeded on the
foundations of patent law.
Compulsory licenses cannot be the only avenue through which countries deal with
their medical crises, including the HIV/AIDS epidemic. While compulsory licenses can
help in some ways, they are far from a permanent fix. Partnerships provide a much more
209 TRIPS
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stable opportunity through which to provide essential medicines, money, and other help
needed to deal with the HIV/AIDS issues in developing countries. This viable alternative
to compulsory licenses provides a secure, realistic, and reasonable solution to the
HIV/AIDS epidemic devastating developing countries.
